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Chapter 1: Introduction
The United States maintains a vast network of overseas military installations to
project American foreign policy, defend national interests, and provide tangible support
to our regional and global security partners. This network of installations spans six
continents and provides the logistical and forward deployed presence required to support
American military units stationed or engaged in overseas operations.
The latest report released by the Department of Defense lists over 423 sites in 26
countries outside the United States (Department of Defense, 2011). Though these bases
are spread throughout six continents, large portions are concentrated in just two
countries: Germany and Japan. The United States established these bases at the end of
World War II, and military personnel and equipment are frequently rotated between them
while serving to project American power, stabilize traditionally unstable regions and
protect the interests of the United States (Dur, 2000, p. 471; Overseas Basing
Commission, 2005).
Though seldom discussed domestically in the United States, these installations
sometimes encounter fierce resistance or domestic debate in the host states questioning
the role of foreign military forces in sovereign states far from their national lands
(Johnson, 2004, p. 223-224; Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179).

Germany, serving as the

industrial heart of Europe, has been able to successfully integrate United States military
bases into society (Cunningham and Klemmer, 1995; Smoke, 1996, p. 305-306).
However, the basing relationship in Japan has consistently been more problematic
(Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179).

American military bases in Japan are not entirely
1

unwelcome (Foster, 2011), yet they have struggled, particularly in recent years, to
become integrated into the country due to several unfortunate incidents of military
personnel targeting local civilians. At the crux of the basing issue in Japan is the
stationing of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on Okinawa, the southernmost
prefecture of Japan (Johnson, 2007, p. 171-207; CNN, 2008). The bases and stationing
of this unit on Okinawa is the subject of considerable domestic debate within Japan, and
between the United States and Japan. These debates have resulted in several plans to
relocate them within the prefecture of Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific.
Current relocation plans fail to take into account several geostrategic factors
concerning the regional United States military posture and the overarching role of United
States military forces in Japan (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005). This research seeks
to address these oversights and present alternate basing options while also providing clear
guidance on the mission and role of these forces. Alternate basing options are crucial for
the United States in order to maintain positive relations with Japan and, therefore, our
military presence within its sovereign borders.
The results of this thesis will offer alternate relocation strategies for American
military units within Japan in support of the United States-Japan alliance and American
foreign policy in the region.

Specifically, this thesis will provide an analysis for

identifying locations within Japan to which the 3rd MEF may relocate, rather than to
locations outside of Japan. This research therefore seeks to identify locations within the
main islands of Japan that could serve as a new home for the 3rd MEF whose presence on
Okinawa has strained United States-Japanese relations for more than 20 years. Given the
increasing importance of East Asia in the world economy as a whole, and the United
2

States in particular (International Monetary Fund, 2011b), the need to maintain these
forward deployed military units and serve as an “honest broker” (Ishihara, 2011, p. 3) in
the region is of critical importance to the security of the United States. Furthermore, the
delicate balance of political-military relations in East Asia requires the presence of such
an honest broker who can potentially balance the histories and dialogue between all
states, regardless of past grievances.
This study begins with a background and literature review of the factors and
history relating to the basing of United States military units in Japan from theoretical,
historical and operational standpoints. First, the history of United States-Japanese
relations and the development of the modern treaty agreement is examined to understand
United States interest in Japan. Second, the domestic politics of Japan, post-World War
II, and the role United States military forces have had on them are contextualized within
the framework of East Asian security. Third, the strategic uses of United States military
forces in Japan are analyzed to operationalize the mission potential for these units and
how their basing location affects the mission. Finally, utilizing critical data from these
sections, criteria were developed to examine the current base relocation plan for the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Unit on Okinawa.
Chapter Three provides an overview of the data sets and methodologies utilized
within this study.

The Department of Defense Base Structure Report, an annually

released account of United States military installations worldwide, is analyzed as the
primary data set to understand the extent of overseas American military basing. This will
include analysis of base sizes or footprints, the primary use of the bases, financial costs
and mapping of their location. Next, locations and capabilities of Japanese military
3

installations within the main islands of Japan are examined and overlaid with United
States military installations to provide possible locations for joint basing opportunities.
Finally, capabilities of military equipment and transportation are mapped to determine the
scope of response by American military units based upon proposed or alternate base
relocations.
Chapter Four provides a critical analysis, utilizing criteria developed in Chapter
Two, of the current relocation plan of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit proposed by the
Department of Defense through a comprehensive mapping of transportation capabilities
and potential contingency operations. Chapter Five presents an alternate relocation plan
for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit that satisfies the criteria established in Chapter
Two and falls within suitable geographic distance of potential contingency operations.
The Sixth Chapter summarizes the study results and presents recommendations
for policy changes that address the noted deficiencies.

The conclusion and

recommendations for future research are put forth in Chapter Seven.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The role of American military forces in Japanese domestic affairs is not a
development constrained to the post-World War II environment. Clear contextualization
of our mutual histories is concomitant to understanding the challenges facing our alliance
today.

A concise account of United States-Japanese relations is covered, including

American military interventions in Japan prior to World War II, along with the more
recent history of strained relations due to incidents on Okinawa. This section also
provides an overview of operations by American military forces in Japan to contextualize
the role Japan plays in America’s forward deployed presence in East Asia.

2.2 History of United States Overseas Basing
Conceptually, the structure of United States overseas basing evolved from the
analytical framework of naval warfare as put forth by Alfred Thayer Mahan in a series of
books and publications at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century. Mahan, a
United States naval officer who eventually attained the rank of rear admiral (postretirement by an act of Congress), completed several in-depth studies of naval history and
warfare and concluded that a strong national seapower was required in order for a state to
become a major power on the world stage (Mahan, 1920, p. 284-290). Viewing the vast
technological improvements in ship design during his career, Mahan recognized that the
development of steam powered warships highlighted “the Nation’s inability to coal and
supply its own fleets” (Hart, 1965, p. 300) while deployed and this was due to the lack of
overseas bases or coaling stations. Additionally, he recognized that other major powers
5

had addressed these issues by creating “stations along the road, like the Cape of Good
Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defense and war; the
demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the
Gulf of St. Laurence, posts whose value was chiefly strategic” (Mahan, 1920, p. 20). The
obvious gap therefore was extraterritorial support for American naval deployments.
While Mahan’s theories spread throughout naval circles both within the United
States and abroad, Halford MacKinder, a British geographer, published a serious of
works concerning what he termed the heartland or geographical pivot (MacKinder,
1943). In these works, MacKinder argued that control over the vast resources of the
Eurasian continent by one power would empower such a state so greatly that the entire
world could be threatened by its expansion. Identifying this Eurasian heartland as modern
day Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Mackinder believed that this region’s vast
resources, population and, most importantly, protection from seaborne invasion thereby
providing defense in depth, offered the nucleus or pivoting point for any expansion
towards global domination. The state that controlled these areas would be the pivot state
in global power politics (MacKinder, 1943, p. 596-598). Identifying the threat that the
Soviet Union or an alliance of Asian states could pose by solely controlling this area,
MacKinder argued for the continual balance of power and prevention of a land power
becoming so powerful that it controlled the entire Eurasian continent (MacKinder, 1943).
The combination of these two geo-strategists’ theories results in two very basic,
yet complex to manage, dictums for United States foreign policy. First, the United States
must balance its foreign relations and military engagement towards prevention of a
hegemonic Eurasian land power similar to the actions of the United Kingdom from 17th
6

century to the start of World War II (Kissinger, 1994, p. 70-77, 826). Doing so would
prevent the capability of any one, or alliance, of states from dominating the heartland,
expanding throughout the Eurasian continent, and utilizing the available resources to
consolidate land power while developing sea power.
Second, in order to prevent a hegemonic land power from attaining Eurasian
continental supremacy, the United States must maintain naval forces on par, or
exceeding, other great powers in the state system. These naval forces must be available
for deployment or combat action off or within, the Eurasian continent, thereby requiring
considerable logistics and/or overseas bases from which to project American power.
MacKinder himself recognized this and called Britain a “moated forward stronghold”
(MacKinder, 1943, p. 301) from which the United States, itself a defense in depth for the
Western Powers, could project air, land, and seapower onto the Eurasian continent’s
western-most area.
It is not perhaps a stretch therefore to see Japan, a state in similar geographical
position to the United Kingdom, as the British twin off the Eurasian continent in the East.
Finally, MacKinder, perhaps referencing the works of Mahan, states “seapower must in
the final resort be amphibious if it is to balance land power” (MacKinder, 1943, p. 301302), viewed in the context of East Asia, the role of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force
could not be clearer.
The establishment and maintenance of overseas American military bases is not a
new phenomenon, and has been a fixture of United States foreign policy for over 150
years.

The current purpose and theoretical approach that defines their continued
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functioning is less clear. Advocates of isolationism see few benefits to far flung bases
with long lines of communication and supply (Parent and MacDonald, 2011), yet a robust
overseas basing structure endures within the United States military.
In the context of United States bases in Japan, understanding the history and
nature of the bases there will assist in building recommendations for the current
realignment plan to ensure the geostrategic dictums of Mahan and MacKinder are still
supported.

2.3 United States – Japan relations before the 1951 Security Agreement
During the 19th century the United States had expanded throughout much of what
are today the territorial borders of the 50 states. As the United States moved to develop
commercial and military interests overseas, the need to support distant deployments of
warships in support of these activities became apparent. With the introduction of steam
powered warships the need for coaling stations overseas became a top priority for United
States military planners. In the Pacific, with its immense distances between land masses
necessitating the need for resupply ports, the United States had only recently begun to
develop diplomatic relations (Hart, 1965, p. 18, 32-33, 54-55). These challenges had
been brought to the forefront in 1851-1852 during the deployment of the USS
Susquehanna to her stationing as the command ship of the East India Squadron in China.
The Susquehanna was forced to rely on other state’s hospitality and expensive coal
resources during her journey from Norfolk to Hong Kong (Symonds, 2001, p. 72),
presenting tactical and strategic challenges to future deployments of steam powered ships
(Hart, 1965, p. 54-55). Many believed that the lands of East Asia should be opened to the
West to provide resupply, trade and diplomatic opportunities, whether those states
8

desired to be opened or not (Adams, 1842, p. 288-289). Japan, which had long been
closed to western influence in a self-imposed closure called Sakoku (Samuels, 2008, p.
13), threatened death to trespassers or ship-wrecked sailors. The Tokugawa Shogunate,
which ruled Japan since 1603, restricted western access to mainland Japan through
Dejima, a small artificial island in the bay of Nagasaki, founded in 1641 and used
primarily by the Dutch to trade with the Shogunate (McClain, 2002, p. 44-45).
American ships, flagged as Dutch, had been using the port to trade. However,
attempts at true diplomatic or trading relations with the Shogunate failed, even after
several attempts (1837, 1846 and 1849) to engage in discussions (Lawrence, 1953). The
last expedition in 1849 by Commander James P. Glynn, which secured the release of
shipwrecked American sailors, had demonstrated the potential for success. Upon his
return to the United States, Commander Glynn recommended that future endeavors
include more forceful demands for relations, particularly after seeing how horribly
American prisoners were treated by the Japanese (McClain, 2002, p. 135).
In 1852 Commodore Perry was named the new commander of the East India
Squadron and charged with opening Japan. The United States government ordered Perry
to secure from the Tokugawa Shogunate “Japanese agreement to protect American
seamen who were either ship-wrecked on Japan’s coast or driven into Japanese ports by
bad weather; a similar agreement to allow the establishment of American coaling and
supply stations at selected Japanese ports; and permission for U.S. vessels to enter one or
more Japanese ports for trade” (Symonds, 2001, p. 74). After arriving on station in
Shanghai in 1853, Perry, with the East India Squadron, set out for Japan with three stops:
the Ryukyu Islands or present day Okinawa, which had not yet been annexed by Japan, to
9

secure aid for any future shipwrecked American sailors, Chichi-Jima (known in Japan as
part of the Ogasawara island group) to assess the small islands feasibility as a future
coaling station for American warships, and finally Tokyo Bay to negotiate with the
Tokugawa Shogunate for United States diplomatic and commercial interests.
Commodore Perry was successful not only at each of these stops but also in the overall
charge of opening Japan to American interests, protecting American sailors and
establishing ports of entry with coaling stations (Navy Department Library, 1953;
Symonds, 2001, p. 74; McClain, 2002, p. 138). These concessions were signed on March
31st 1854 and came to be known as the Treaty of Kanagawa, effectively opening Japan up
to American, and later European, trade, diplomatic and regional ambitions (McClain,
2002, p. 134-142).
Though the Treaty of Kanagawa was the first, many treaties were signed by Japan
with the Western Powers in the coming years and the nature of these changed as access to
Japan became more commonplace. These treaties became more unequal, in both the
commercial and diplomatic sense, as the Western Powers demanded ever greater access
and Japan found itself in a progressively weaker negotiating position. This period came
to be known as the Bakumatsu, or End of the Curtain, as the Tokugawa Shogunate
struggled to remain in power in the face of growing domestic opposition to western
influence and a desire to restore the imperial family to power in place of the Shogunate.
This movement became known as Sonnō-jōi or Revere the emperor, Expel the barbarians
and was responsible for widespread outbreaks of violence against western citizens in the
trading ports (McClain, 2002, p. 144, 146-148). The Western Powers engaged in several
small scale battles throughout Japan from 1863-1864 with the final Battle of Shimonoseki
10

in September 1864, representing the first failed opportunity for Japan to remove western
forces from her shores. Before the decade ended, Japan would experience its own civil
war, pitting pro-imperial forces against the declining power of the Shogunate.
Originally seeking to expel the barbarians, the pro-imperial party eventually
shifted to one of modernization and negotiation with the West, including the United
States.

The imperial party developed a national policy of Fukoku Kyōhei or Rich

country, strong army (Samuels, 2008, p. 15). The ultimate victors of the Civil War, the
pro-imperial faction established the Meiji Emperor as the sole sovereign of the state in
what came to be called the Meiji Restoration.
Considered by McClain (2002) as the beginning of the modern period of Japan,
the Meiji Restoration in 1868 marked the shift of Japan from a feudal society to one
driven to modernize with western technology through commercial and military
enterprises (McClain, 2002, p. 155-171).

Additionally, the re-established emperor

worked to re-negotiate the unequal treaties imposed upon Japan by the Western Powers
while simultaneously rapidly importing and developing a domestic military base on par
with most of the great Western Powers.
For the remainder of the 19th century, American and Japanese interests would run
parallel with the United States solidifying itself as a Pacific power through military
victories in the Philippines, as well as the annexation of Hawaii (Mahan, 1900, p. 7-12).
During the same period Japan rapidly modernized its military capabilities and tested them
against other regional states such as China and Korea (McClain, 2002, p. 295-300).
American military units forward deployed to East Asia were supported by coaling and
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repair installations throughout the newly acquired territories following the SpanishAmerican War in 1898 (Hart, 1965, p. 32-33) as the United States continued to establish
itself as an Asian power through the use of trade, diplomacy and shows of force such as
the Great White Fleet in 1907-1909 (Hart, 1965).
Relations continued amicably between the United States and Japan and in 1908
they signed the Root-Takahira Agreement which required that Japan recognize American
sovereignty in the Philippines and that the United States recognize Japanese interests on
the Korean Peninsula.

Though tensions sometimes were ratcheted up as these two

powers jockeyed for position in East Asia (Hart, 1965, p. 204-236), relations between the
United States and Japan would remain relatively stable until the 1930s with the
aggressive expansion of Japanese military interests on the Asian mainland.
This expansion of Japanese imperial power in the 1930s would be the catalyst for
American involvement in the Second World War in the Pacific. The Pacific theater
pitted Japanese imperial forces against an American led allied coalition that, after four
years of island hopping, resulted in the unconditional surrender of imperial Japan in
1945.
At the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, the United States found
itself in control of vast expanses of territory in Europe and the Pacific that had recently
been under the dominion of the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy and Japan.

The

demarcation of state borders in both theaters of conflict contained inherent problems that
provided challenges to clear, effective post-war occupation.
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In Europe, Allied forces struggled, diplomatically, to re-draw borders and develop
clear guidelines on occupation zones (Kissinger, 1994, p. 417). This was a particularly
challenging task while Soviet forces continued to occupy large portions of Eastern
Europe. In the Pacific, where the United States had shouldered a majority of the Allied
war burden, distribution of the Japanese Empire fell to officials of the War and State
departments.
Formosa, or Taiwan, was returned to China, the Philippines, which had largely
been liberated by allied forces, were returned to the United States, and British territories
throughout Asia returned to British control. The remaining territories of the Japanese
Empire, principally those that were considered part of Japan rather than colonies of the
Empire (Korea, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, the Ryukyu Islands, the main islands of Japan and
the Kurils) were coveted by the Allied powers for both their strategic and economic
potential.
Soviet demands for an occupation zone within the main islands of Japan met
fierce resistance within the War and State departments and rather than provide the Soviet
Union with a toehold on the main islands, the United States instead offered the northern
half of the newly split Korea to the Soviet Union along with Japanese territory on
Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to which Stalin, more concerned with events in the
European theater, acquiesced.
The result was a Japan vastly different, both geographically and politically, than
one that had existed before the war. Gone were the vast continental territories with their
resources and the infrastructure to extract them. The Empire of Japan, which at its height
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encompassed almost 2.9 million square miles of territory along with vast expanses of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, was reduced to controlling only the four main islands of
Japan: Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku. Here, United States occupation forces
established bases to ensure the peaceful transition of Japan from a martial imperial state
to a democratic and capitalist one.
In a repeat of history, over 90 years after Commodore Matthew Perry’s initial
opening, the United States once again forcefully entered Japan encouraging open
government and free trade (McClain, 2002, p. 523-524). Unsurprisingly, Japan, again,
learned and mastered the rules of the game swiftly by rebuilding and becoming a global
economic power in less than 20 years. This recovery, dubbed an economic miracle
(McClain, 2002, p. 562-563, 571-582), was supported by United States investment and
trade, particularly following the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, and the
continuing presence of United States military forces on the islands in support of the
newly established security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951.
This treaty was essentially a part of the San Francisco Treaty, detailing the full
closure of the Pacific theatre of World War II, and reflective of the dramatic shift that
Japanese national policy had experienced following the end of the Second World War
(McClain, 2002, p. 555-558). United States military forces would maintain bases within
the main islands of Japan while the Ryukyu Islands or Okinawa was given to the United
States as a military colony. Sacrificed once at the end of World War II to buy the main
islands of Japan time, the relinquishment of the prefecture to the United States was a
convenient way for Japan to ignore another troubled part of its past. Domestically, the
imperial national policy of Fukoku Kyōhei, or Rich country, Strong army, was thrown out
14

with the signing of unconditional surrender onboard the USS Missouri on September 9th
1945.

In its stead, a policy had been developed that built upon the new Japanese

constitution, which outlawed war, military forces, and incorporated the long term goals of
one government official: Shigeru Yoshida.

2.4 The Cold War Treaty Era: 1950-1996
Elected as the last Prime Minister of the Empire of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida
believed that Japan’s future lay in close concert with those of the West, particularly the
United States and United Kingdom, and he worked to secure Japan’s economic future
while essentially relinquishing Japan’s foreign and military policy to the United States
(McClain, 2002, p. 555-558). The new constitution, created by American occupation
authorities and accepted by the Japanese government, included a clause on the
renunciation of war of which Yoshida took full advantage. This clause, Article 9 of the
constitution, allowed only the maintenance of a self-defense force to act as a response
force to domestic crisis or minor threats to Japanese territorial integrity.

The true

protection of Japan from external threats would come from the permanent stationing of
United States military units throughout Japan in support of the newly signed security
agreement.
By agreeing to these limits on Japanese military power, Yoshida met objectives
not otherwise attainable in the post-war atmosphere of political debate (McClain, 2002, p.
555-558). Perhaps most important, Yoshida was able to solidify power and prevent a
resurgence of militarism or revisionist political parties that wished to make Japan a
“normal nation” again through rearmament (Samuels, 2008, p. 32). By doing so the
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liberal internationalists, of whom Yoshida was one, were able to focus government
spending on economic revival rather than rearmament and military procurement.
Though the country had been devastated by over 14 years of warfare, Yoshida
understood the economic potential Japan maintained, if it could avoid entanglements in
military affairs. To accomplish this, during his first of three terms in office as Prime
Minister, Yoshida worked with occupation authorities to build an “unequal alliance with
the United States and [to use] it as a shield behind which [Japan] could regenerate
prosperity” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32). By doing so, Samuels states that “the only dangers to
Japanese prosperity and security were abandonment by the United States or entanglement
in U.S. Wars” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32) for which Yoshida, and subsequent prime ministers,
pointed to the pacifist constitution and Article 9 which prevented Japan from becoming
involved in such entanglements. This policy, of free riding under the American security
umbrella, supporting American military bases within Japan, and preventing large defense
expenditures, became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Domestically, the politics of the
Yoshida Doctrine were not accepted by all and opponents of Yoshida, namely Kishi
Nobusuke’s anti-mainstream conservatives, worked to remove United States military
forces from Japan and develop domestic military capability. This challenge came to a
head in 1960 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
the United States and Japan, a revision of the 1951 security treaty, when Nobuske’s
opponents of the Yoshida Doctrine attempted to attain more autonomy for Japan with the
eventual removal of United States military forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 42-43). Instead, this
1960 treaty expanded the integration of United States and Japanese forces, codified a
status of forces agreement for the stationing of United States military forces in Japan, and
16

empowered the Japanese Self Defense Force to participate in collective security of the
main islands of Japan. Frequently a point of contention between the United States and
Japan, this policy has facilitated the establishment of a network of American military
bases in Japan and the growth of the Japanese economy into one of the world’s largest
(3rd as of 2012) (International Monetary Fund, 2011a).
Externally, the Yoshida Doctrine was tested first during the outbreak of hostilities
on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. United States military units stationed on occupation
duty in Japan were the closest allied forces available to come to the aid of the newly
formed South Korea. On the main islands of Japan, the newly formed civil police force
was transformed overnight into an unofficial military force, the precursor of the Japanese
Self Defense Force. The major changes though developed on Okinawa, the new military
colony of the United States in East Asia. In support of combat operations on the Korean
Peninsula, military facilities on Okinawa were rapidly developed and used as staging
points for troop rotations and bombing raids. The United States military mobilization on
Okinawa was a direct result of the United States belief that the loss of Korea to the
communists would further endanger Japan. The need therefore to contain the spread of
communism and push back the North Korean advance required a sovereign, fully
militarized location in the Pacific, unconstrained even by the welcoming nature of the
Yoshida Doctrine. Many therefore recognize the United States involvement in Korea,
and the subsequent military development of Okinawa, as the evolution of Kennan’s
defense of “strong points” into the implementation of NSC-68, the policy of containment
(Gaddis, 2005, p. 89). The new policy of containment, as first outlined by the Truman
administration and evolved by subsequent presidential administrations, stated that: “any
17

substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise
the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength
could be assembled” and “the assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the
context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a
defeat everywhere (Gaddis, 2005, p. 89).” The implementation of George Kennan’s
theory of containment, the belief that the spread of communism must be contained to
prevent it from encroaching upon those areas the United States believed to be crucial to
its own security, was the use of American military forces from Japan in the Korean War
(Gaddis, 2005, p. ix). President Truman said as much during his address at the outbreak
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula stating:
Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the
Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if
South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened
to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were
permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition
from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist
threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors (Truman, 1956, p.
335).
This view, that the loss of South Korea to North Korean forces would threaten free
institutions, and particularly Japan, directly led to United States intervention on the
Korean Peninsula and the military buildup on Okinawa. Furthermore it can be argued
that:
The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led
directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point...
is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from
considerations of US policy toward Japan (Kim, 1973, p. 46).
Led by General Douglas MacArthur, appointed as commander of the United
Nations Command in South Korea, United States military forces on occupation duty in
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Japan acted as a quick response force swiftly deploying to areas in South Korea to stem
the advance of North Korean troops until additional units could arrive from the
continental United States through the bases on Okinawa. This role of an expeditionary
quick response force has come to define some, if not a majority, of the stationing of
United States military forces in Japan. In a recent book discussing the new American
maritime strategy for the 21st century, Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian at Kings
College London states:
…specific mention is made of the more post-modern benefits of forward
deployed expeditionary capabilities, particular[ly] their capacity to
contribute to homeland defense in depth, their advantages in fostering and
sustaining cooperative relationship with other nations and, most
significantly, their ability to ‘prevent or contain local disruptions before
they impact the global system’ (Till, 2011, p. 338).
Though Till goes on to discuss how expeditionary operations against Iraq and
Afghanistan fall into this category, this discussion can easily be prescribed to United
States expeditionary forces currently stationed in Japan.
Not addressed by Till is the impact on the local populations in foreign countries
that serve as host to these forces. On Okinawa, where the 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Force is stationed, deep emotions on the role of military forces in civilian communities,
developed in World War II and exacerbated by the military development of Okinawa
during the Korean War, create pacifist or anti-militaristic sentiment. During the postWorld War II period of 1950-1972 Okinawa served as the keystone of the Pacific for
United States military forces operating throughout East Asia including Korea and
Vietnam. Okinawans, not wholly American citizens and never truly Japanese, struggled
to identify with a national character from either state, particularly challenging as they
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hosted a majority of United States military forces in Japan. The reversion of Okinawa to
Japanese sovereignty in 1972 altered the minutia of daily life, such as which side of the
road vehicles drove on, yet the unequal usage of Okinawa as the host to a majority of
United States forces in Japan continued as did Tokyo’s failure to address the complicated
history of the imperial period. Throughout the balance of the Cold War Okinawa would
continue to serve as the staging ground for United States military deployments in East
Asia, particularly as the Pacific hedge against Soviet regional aggression. Figure 2.1
depicts the present, continued unequal structure of United States military forces in Japan.
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Figure 2.1 Major bases of United States Forces Japan in terms of personnel and
equipment. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
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2.5 Challenges to the Alliance: 1996 - Present
Japanese domestic politics remained relatively stable throughout the Cold War
with liberal internationalists supporting the Yoshida Doctrine through the limitation of
the Japanese Self Defense Forces in favor of the United States security umbrella. As the
Cold War came to a close these policies began to shift in the direction of a more focused
domestic discussion on defense capabilities and normal nation status. In 1996, five years
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan met again to
officially renew the security alliance.

Japanese politicians, keen on improving the

capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force and gaining closer equality in the alliance,
agreed to new cooperative guidelines that expanded the role of Japanese forces. For the
first time since World War II, Japanese forces would be permitted to engage in combat,
officially defend the country, and engage in regional security operations. These changes,
though minor, redefined the security relationship by supporting incremental remilitarization of Japanese international policy including the deployment of troops and
ships to the Middle East during the Iraq War (Samuels, 2008, p. 92-97).

This

modernization of the relationship and capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force
skirted the limitations imposed by the Japanese constitution and facilitated discussions on
mission expansion and regional deterrence. The core tenants of the Yoshida Doctrine
became more flexible as Japanese Self Defense Forces were given humanitarian and
peace keeping missions around the world. Normal nationalists, those that wished for
Japan to become a normal nation again by maintaining a true military, were testing the
boundaries of acceptable roles for the Self Defense Forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 91-98).
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In 2006 the Japanese Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense, a full
cabinet level department of the Japanese government (Samuels, 2008, p. 75). The slow
yet steady military modernization of the Japanese military continues. Perhaps most
disconcerting is the historical troubled apologies of Japan. Japan’s imperial past contains
some of the most vicious war crimes committed on the planet, all against its regional
neighbors, and all mostly un-acknowledged by Japan. The visit by Japanese prime
ministers to the famous Yasukuni war shrine is perhaps the most obvious example of
Japan’s unwillingness to acknowledge its imperial past yet other, less publicized, issues
remain. The textbooks of Japanese schools fail to give globally acceptable accounts of
the imperial period and frequently skip crucial facts such as the Nanking Massacre,
further alienating and inflaming the populations of regional neighbors that had
experienced these horrible events (Samuels, 2008, pg. 113-115).
Perhaps the final complication to the United States-Japanese relationship is the
lack of a post-Cold War mission statement for United States Forces Japan. The lack of a
direct threat to Japanese territorial integrity, in the form of the Soviet Union, has put the
mission of United States forces in Japan adrift. Okinawa, reverted to Japanese control in
1972 in exchange for a Japanese commitment to regional defense (Samuels, 2008, p. 43),
continued to bear the brunt of the United States basing burden without a clear need for
such forces to exist. Interestingly, other regional United States commands maintained
clear guidelines on the mission and commanders intent. In Korea, the United States
Forces Korea command maintained the mission of “deter, defend, and defeat external
aggression” (United States Forces Korea, 2012) with its primary opponent, North Korea,
which had maintained power. Fixated for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, USFK
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had no need for a mission shift. United States Pacific Command, the parent command of
both USFJ and USFK, maintained the same expected broad based mission of:
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), together with other U.S.
Government agencies, protects and defends the United States, its
territories, Allies, and interests; alongside Allies and partners, promotes
regional security and deters aggression; and, if deterrence fails, is prepared
to respond to the full spectrum of military contingencies to restore AsiaPacific stability and security (United States Pacific Command, 2010)
Interestingly, the strategic guidance for USPACOM addresses specific concerns in the
Asia-Pacific region such as the Korean Peninsula, the United States-China and United
States-India relationship yet no mention is made of Japan or United States Forces Japan
(United States Pacific Command, 2010). This oversight speaks directly to the lack of
mission for United States military forces in Japan and complicates the relationship
between the United States and Japan. As Japanese domestic politics moves towards a
stance of acceptable re-militarization the United States must either work to co-opt these
forces into joint ventures or work to prevent full scale militarization of Japan, particularly
as other regional states become ever more concerned with Japan’s intentions. These
factors, of the remilitarization of Japan, a lack of mission for United States Forces Japan,
and unresolved imperial histories come to the forefront in discussions on United States
military bases on Okinawa.

Here, the protests against basing and remilitarization

comingle with the troubled past of Okinawa’s sacrifice by Tokyo in World War II and
then its sacrifice in the aftermath, as an American military colony.

Understanding

military realignments and their effect on Okinawa is crucial to contextualizing the
complications of United States military forces in Japan and the purpose for their
presence.
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2.6 Base Realignments and Okinawa
The post-Cold War basing structure of United States military units underwent
critical examinations and realignments following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. The success of the containment strategy caught the Department of Defense by
surprise and presented challenges to the existing base structure, the purpose of which had
been to defend against Soviet aggression (Gaddis, 2005, p. 59). As the realities of the
uni-polar global security environment became apparent, calls for base closures and
realignments became a more frequent aspect of United States politics with commissions
created five times, post-Soviet collapse, to analyze United States military posture and
suggest changes (Department of Defense, 2005a).
These commissions, called Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), have done
much to focus public discussions on the 21st century needs and geo-strategic
requirements of United States military and foreign policies. Unfortunately, the remaining
Cold War basing structure contains anomalies that cause friction with some United States
overseas partners.

These partners, which are commonly part of a larger security

framework, provide land, financial support and in many cases, joint training with
American military units based in their country. The friction caused by this Cold War era
military basing structure provides ammunition for anti-American sentiment in these
countries and deters the growth and development of closer ties between the United States
and these security partners (Otis, 2009; Koo, 2011). One such example is the bilateral
security agreement between the United States and Japan with the stationing of over thirty
thousand American military personnel throughout the Japanese islands. Over 74% of
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these personnel are based on the island of Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of
Japan.
Okinawa, the smallest prefecture of Japan, has been host to a majority of the
American ground combat troops, with their attached support and transportation units such
as helicopters and transport planes, for a majority of the post-war period. This basing has
developed friction both on the island, between United States military units, the
Okinawans, and with the federal government in Tokyo. The friction is due, in large part,
to several high profile crimes by United States military personnel that victimized local
Okinawan civilians. This put strain on the United States-Japan security agreements and
led some to question the presence of such a large foreign military contingent on the small
island (Johnson, 2004). Compounding this is the growth of commercial and residential
developments around the bases that has led to complaints of noise pollution from military
aircraft (Bandow, 1998). These challenges ultimately stem from the political and civilian
pressures of basing large units of foreign military personal on a small, relatively closed,
island economy and environment such as Okinawa.
Recent dialogue between the United States and Japan has been to address some of
the more salient issues such as noise pollution, base proximity to residential housing
sectors, and concerns with the threat of crime. The result of this dialogue has been
several plans to relocate some United States military units to a more remote part of
Okinawa and other units to the United States territory of Guam (Fogarty, 2010; Kan,
2012). This dialogue, though positive in its attempt to finally address issues brought
forth by the people of Okinawa for decades, fails to take into account the environmental
and planning complications of moving these military units and also the effect they would
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have not only on their new home locations but on American geostrategic interests in the
region.
The Overseas Basing Commission, formed in 2002 to assess the potential closure
and realignment of United States overseas bases, found significant faults with existing
plans for realignments, including the realignment of forces on Okinawa.

Their

assessment of the existing methodology for base realignments overseas was very critical
stating that:
The Commission must emphasize that considerations of rebasing cannot
be seen as an aside from … major strategic deliberations. It cannot be
merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs. Nor can it be the
fallout of diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid
pro quo for a bilateral arrangement there. The entire basing structure of
the United States, both domestic and international, must be an integrated
whole and must relate directly to the national security strategy of the
United States (Emphasis added) (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p.
6).

Furthermore, the plans developed have not taken into consideration how “our
presence in Okinawa is related to our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Taiwan Straits
and other locations in East Asia” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 14) and that
“Okinawa is the strategic linchpin to operational capabilities in East Asia. Diminishing
our combat capability on the island would pose great risk to our national interests in the
region” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. C&R2).
The Commission identified several deficiencies with the existing base restructure
on Okinawa that were seemingly ignored and recommended that policy makers consider
alternate options. One example was delaying any planned moves until the 2005 BRAC
report had been finalized. This report, though it dealt specifically with domestic force
posturing of United States military forces, could provide guidelines for realignments
27

outside the United States. Consequently, discussions on base realignments for Okinawa
were delayed, in the hopes that clearer guidance could be obtained from the release of the
2005 BRAC report.
Base Realignments and Closure

The United States government has gone through five iterations of base closures
and realignments since the closing days of the Cold War.

Starting in 1988, the

Department of Defense created a process to examine its current and future military basing
requirements in light of budget cuts, a desire for increased efficiency and a general
thawing of relations with the Soviet Union (BRAC Commission, 1988, p. 8-11). These
BRACs made recommendations to Congress and the President to disband or move
existing military bases and ensure the local base economy and environment would be
supported following the removal of the base.
Though each round of BRACs caused considerable debate, primarily from
legislators trying to keep bases in their state for local financial reasons (Spencer, 2005, p.
6), they all concluded with major shifts in US military basing, both domestic and
overseas. The latest BRAC concluded in 2005 resulted in the closure of over 180
military facilities and the realignment of over 133,000 service members (Department of
Defense, 2005b). Throughout these procedures, officials have worked to develop clear
guidelines and recommendations for future BRACs or other Department of Defense
installation movements. One key point made during the first round in 1988 was the role
urban development has had on bases. The first commission stated:
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The Commission found that many bases have experience[d] an erosion of
their military value as a result of urban development. The resulting
encroachment has forced the modification of missions at many
installations. The acquisition of additional land, especially in less
populated area[s], may be needed to satisfy military requirements (BRAC
Commission, 1988, p. 7).
Policy planners have since attempted to mitigate the effect bases have had on the
surrounding population and limit the number of bases developed or maintained within
urban areas. On Okinawa, this problem has yet to be resolved and speaks to the clear
disjunction between prior BRACs and the on-going controversy over United States
military bases on Okinawa. The continued usage of military bases in densely populated
and developed urban areas on Okinawa has facilitated the anti-American sentiment
prevalent by native Okinawans due to both the negative effects on continued
development, along with other quality of life factors such as noise pollution and increased
crime. Current American military bases on Okinawa take up 20% of the land area and
constitute large portions of the major cities and towns including 82.8% of Ginowan, the
location of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. In this city the population
density, due to American military ownership of a majority of the city land, is 4,853 /km2
(Japanese Statistics Bureau, 2011)1.

1

The Japanese Statistics Bureau does not release population densities for units below the
prefecture level. This population density was calculated based on the Japanese Statistics
Bureau census for Ginowan and publicly available information on the size of the town of
Ginowan.
29

Figure 2.2 Land use by United States Forces Japan by acreage. Okinawa, the
smallest prefecture, contains the highest density of United States military forces
of all prefectures. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012).
Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
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These population densities are higher than the city of Chicago yet have drastically
different cityscapes due to building height restrictions imposed by the American military
ownership of Okinawan airspace (Global Security, 2011). Compounding the challenge of
high population densities is the result of urban development around the military base
without adequate planning oversight. Due to the nature of military bases requiring high
levels of security, no road, utility, sewer, or connection of any sort passes through these
military bases, creating logistical and urban planning challenges for these cities.
Additionally, the unplanned development of housing and businesses around the bases has
created patchwork networks of partially paved roads and pathways throughout seemingly
developed areas.

These challenges have further hindered the Okinawans ability to

improve their economy and create a stable environment for its citizens. The result is the
prefecture with the lowest per capita income in Japan and the highest level of
unemployment 2 , due primarily to the seasonal nature of Okinawa's largest industry,
tourism (Government of Japan, 2011).

2

Okinawan per capita income has steadily maintained at about 70% of the equivalent of
the main islands of Japan.
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Figure 2.3 Population densities of Japanese prefectures. Though not as dense as
other major metropolitan areas, Okinawa’s disproportionate share of military
bases creates planning complications that do not exist in any other prefecture.
Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Population Data
Source: Japanese Statistics Bureau (2011).
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Perhaps the final issue that has pushed the Okinawan base issue to the forefront of
the current discourse on the United States-Japan security agreement was the 1995 rape of
a twelve year old school girl by three American service members. This incident, one of
several high-profile crimes committed by Americans against Okinawan civilians,
understandably inflamed the civilian population and led to questions about the role these
bases have in the modern, post-Cold-War era.

Following this incident, discussions

between the governments of Japan and the United States were opened to find an
alternative option for several of the American bases on Okinawa (McCurry, 2008). For
the following decade these discussions continued with varying levels of support from the
federal governments in Tokyo and Washington yet unwavering resolve continued on the
part of the Okinawans.
In 2005, after a decade of discussions on a base transfer and the conclusion of the
American BRAC, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed that the current
restriction on development and the hardships placed on the Okinawans demanded the
removal or realignment of several American military units on the island. The result was
not an official United States Department of Defense-wide base realignment and closure
plan but rather a specific set of moves that would alter the stationing and base structure of
United States military units in Okinawa.
The Okinawan BRAC

The decision to move portions of the United States military stationed on Okinawa
came in 2005 after ten years of negotiations and deliberation by the governments of the
United States and Japan (Yoshikazu, 2006). The plan, set forth and agreed upon by both
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governments, is comprised of two primary sections. The first would see over 8,000
United States Marines, part of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, and their dependents
moved from Okinawa to Guam, a United States dependency over 2,300 kilometers to the
east. The second portion of the move would be a realignment of MCAS Futenma to a
new base offshore of the Henoko Peninsula near Nago, Okinawa. It is this second move,
and the proposition of land reclamation off the Henoko Peninsula, that has caused
massive protests and increased anti-American sentiment on Okinawa over the past
several years (Fogarty, 2010).
Citing the development failure of the current bases on Okinawa, the United States
government believed that any new base constructed on the island itself would eventually
become surrounded by urban development, similar to MCAS Futenma, and put the
governments in a similar situation in the future. The decision to instead reclaim land
offshore of the Henoko Peninsula, currently occupied by the United States Marine Corps
base Camp Schwabb, was deemed the most appropriate to prevent future development
and military operational challenges (Economist, 2005).

Unfortunately, the chosen

location of the water and reefs off the Henoko Peninsula, are domestically-protected sites
and home to several species of threatened species including the dugoung (a relative of the
manatee) and one protected species of sea turtles. The proposed base would reclaim land
currently composed of coral reefs, a pristine ocean bay and the habitats of these protected
animals.
The people of Okinawa, already unhappy with the military basing arrangement in
the densely urban areas, have continued to protest, with the added feature of also
demanding that the base be moved completely away, off the island of Okinawa. Since
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the Japanese public became aware of this plan, protests and around-the-clock occupations
by civilians in the proposed site have occurred (Yoshikazu, 2006). Perhaps the most
unfortunate aspect of this plan is the failure on the part of the governments of Japan and
the United States to consider alternate options, either on Okinawa or elsewhere in the
Pacific. Members of the United States Congress have recommended combining the
planned capabilities of the Henoko Base with Kadena Air Base in Chatan, one of the
most highly populated cities, or on one of the main islands of Japan (Overseas Basing
Commission, 2005, p. C&R4; Dickie, 2011).

Neither option has been seriously

considered, nor, until 2011, have any alternate options been proposed to prevent the
construction of a new base off the Henoko Peninsula.
Environmental ramifications

This failure to consider alternate locations that have less of an impact on the
environment and civilian quality of life represents potentially poor consideration and long
term planning on the part of both governments. Anti-American sentiment on Okinawa,
and throughout Japan, has steadily increased since the 1995 rape incident and has only
gained ground since the proposal for the Henoko Base land reclamation project. The
concept of environmental consideration in the construction of new military bases is not
new to the United States, and in fact previous BRACs have made environmental concerns
an important factor in base construction. In the Base Redevelopment and Realignment
Manual published in 2006, under Complying with Laws that Protect Natural and Cultural
Resources, the Department of Defense states:
As part of the NEPA analysis, the Military Department will analyze the
impacts on natural and cultural resources... Additionally and aside from
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the NEPA requirements, other laws such as the Endangered Species Act
and National Historic Preservation Act require the Military Department to
analyze the impacts on natural and cultural resources and to consult with
Federal and State agencies before making final property disposal decisions
(Emphasis added) (Grone, 2006).
Yet planners have failed to take the local (prefecture) considerations into effect
and have failed to complete an adequate environmental impact report on the construction
of the new base. Moreover, attempts by the United States Department of Defense to
claim it is not responsible for actions committed by the Government of Japan on Okinawa
have failed. In the Dugong v. Gates (2008) lawsuit which contested the United States
Department of Defense claim of “no responsibility” in the construction of the Henoko
base, the United States Federal District Court of Northern California found in favor of the
plaintiffs and ruled that the United States Department of Defense had a responsibility and
requirement to complete an independent Environmental Assessment Report of the
planned base prior to any construction (Dugong v. Gates, 2008; Tanji, 2008).
Though the Department of Defense will complete the assessment, the impact it
will have on the actual base construction is unknown as policy planners continue to speak
in terms that make the base construction all but assured. At a recent presentation in
Washington D.C., the Japanese politician Ishihara Nobuteru (the current SecretaryGeneral of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, historically the most powerful party in
Japan), whom many view as the next Prime Minister of Japan, stated that the question of
the Henoko base transfer is of little importance to the larger vision that is the United
States-Japan security agreement and that the base construction should continue regardless
of any protest by the Okinawans (Ishihara, 2011, p. 4-5). This viewpoint, propagated by
one of the most senior politicians in Japan, is directly against the civilian wishes of
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Okinawa and fails to take a long-term view of the negative consequences this realignment
could have on anti-American sentiment and the overall relationship between the United
States and Japan.

2.7 American Protests of Overseas Basing
Discussions on overseas basing are not always positive and critics frequently cite
the United States’ global structure of bases as an example of American imperialism
resulting in calls for the partial or full withdrawal of United States forces overseas.
Perhaps the most well-known is Chalmers Johnson, a retired professor from the
University of California, San Diego and President of the Japan Policy Research Institute.
Johnson, in several books entitled the Blowback Series, argues that American imperial
overstretch has negatively affected not only the American economy, but also our relations
with the states hosting our bases (Johnson, 2005, p. 310-312). Stating that “the only truly
common elements in the totality of America’s foreign bases are imperialism and
militarism – an impulse on the part of our elites to dominate other peoples largely
because we have the power to do so” (Johnson, 2005, p. 152), Johnson puts forth an
argument that since the end of the Cold War the United States has conjured up false
enemies, including the potential resurgence of Japan itself, in order to maintain overseas
bases and offensive operations in weak states (Johnson, 2005, p. 57-64).
Johnson unabashedly attacks the use of American military bases in Japan as an
occupation force rather than one of peaceful cooperation (Johnson, 2004, p. 36-38).
Glossing over the frequently tense security environment in East Asia, Johnson states that
“the Japanese public does not … believe that their country is threatened by China” and
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that “public opinion in Japan … remains deeply suspicious of American claims that
North Korea is a threat” (Johnson, 2004, p. 58-59). His original work was published in
2004, before a rise in pro-base sentiment by Japanese due to the 2006 North Korean
missile tests and the testing of a nuclear device. Johnson’s more recent book in 2007,
Nemesis, merely modified his commentary on Japanese perceptions of American military
forces by saying “they like being protected by the United States against possible threats
from China and North Korea, but they do not like having foreign troops living anywhere
near them” (Johnson, 2007, p. 205). This critique seems focused on Okinawa and fails to
present data on public perceptions of bases on the main islands of Japan.
Discussing Okinawa, Johnson states that “the government in Tokyo likes [75% of
US forces stationed on Okinawa] this arrangement because it knows that the public will
tolerate American troops on Japanese soil only if they are kept out of sight” (Johnson,
2005, p. 200).

Yet on the next page, he discusses the many United States bases

throughout the main islands of Japan with no serious discussion of public opinion.
Though correct in his assessment of the anti-basing sentiment prevalent on Okinawa,
Johnson does not adequately assess the complete picture of perceptions by the Japanese
public on American military bases in Japan. Nor does he offer arguments valid to
remove the bases in their entirety. Furthermore, recent polling of the Japanese public
shows increases in public support for the American military presence directly
contradicting Johnson’s viewpoints (Foster, 2011). Though Johnson highlights much of
the injustice perpetrated by the United States and the Government of Japan against the
Okinawans he ultimately fails to present a clear, well thought-out plan that addresses the
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needs of Japanese civilians, the security environment in East Asia or American foreign
policy objectives.
In a more recent piece in Foreign Affairs against the forward defense of the
United States, Parent and MacDonald (2011) argue that reducing the presence of overseas
bases could serve as a booster to a struggling American economy, through cost savings,
and not affect military capabilities or create regional instability. Parent and MacDonald
state “forward defense is a holdover from the Cold War” and that should a conflict erupt,
“U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure
the option of quick U.S. intervention” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 37-38).
Though laudable for their desire to reduce government spending, Parent and
MacDonald ultimately fail to account for many intricacies in their broad statements
concerning overseas bases.

First among these is the Omoiyari Yosan, or sympathy

budget, given by the Government of Japan to cover expenses for United States military
forces in Japan. Parent and MacDonald fail to mention or examine the more than 4.4
billion USD that Japan spends yearly to support United States military forces in Japan.
This amount covered 75-% of the costs of United States Forces Japan in 2003 (the most
recent report) and represents the largest subsidy of any state with a United States overseas
base (Department of Defense, 2004, p. B-21). Viewed another way, Japan’s sympathy
budget in support of United States military forces in Japan equated to more than half of
all cost-sharing programs by foreign countries in support of United States overseas bases
(Department of Defense, 2004, p. E-4).
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Another problem with Parent and MacDonald’s desire to realign or close United
States overseas bases is their belief that “U.S. allies … will act as a natural early warning
system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support
for any necessary U.S. responses” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 42). Yet this fails to
account for the intricate relationships that exist in East Asia. For instance, challenging
political questions such as the usage of Japanese ports as logistical hubs in the event of
hostilities in the Taiwan Straits are neither addressed nor mentioned.

Nor are

contingencies relating to the Korean Peninsula, where it would be possible to envision
North Korea threatening nuclear or conventional retaliation at Japan if it were to support
American forces coming to the aide of South Korea, discussed in any context beyond the
need for “rapid response forces” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43). These factors
have been shown to stress the security relationship between the United States and Japan
and they must be accounted for rather than assuming that our allies will always do what is
expected (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 20).
Additionally, Parent and MacDonald do not address the logistical challenges
posed for first responding units, in their plan stationed in Hawaii or on the continental
United States, and responding to a crisis in East Asia.

They only comment that

“outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared
to the risks of the status quo” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 38).

Past studies

conducted by agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office (Congressional Budget
Office, 2005) show that the increased response time, due to the vast distances from the
continental United States to any flash point, along with the increased threat to
interdiction, of crossing 6216 kilometers (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to Yokosuka, Japan) of
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open ocean in times of crisis would be more than just costly.

Additional existing

examinations, of the logistical challenges to mobilizing and deploying military units from
the United States to potential trouble spots, includes the Overseas Basing Commission in
a report prepared for Congress, also in 2005.

Concerning logistical difficulties the

chairman stated “the commission found significant faults – shortcomings in the domestic
rail and port infrastructure needed for deployment, as well as serious limitations in seaand airlift capacity to likely zones of conflict” (Cornella, 2010). Parent and MacDonald
also call for the “shifting of commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests
and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas” (Parent
and MacDonald, 2011, p. 40) without identifying where these areas are. Few would
argue that the East and South China Seas are not “in the most valuable geographic and
functional areas,” and that maintaining the existing “commitments, resources and
investments” is not in the interests of the United States, whether those interests are
economic or geopolitical.
Ultimately, Parent and MacDonald provide an incomplete picture of the overseas
basing structure, particularly as it relates to East Asia, and fail to present an adequate
direction in which planners should start. They call on the United States to maintain only
“rapid response forces” in “valuable geographic and functional areas” without identifying
what that force structure would entail or where it could be stationed.

2.8 Summary
The United States-Japan security alliance is one of the most crucial aspects of
American foreign policy and military deterrence in Asia.
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The maintenance of this

relationship is undoubtedly paramount to policy planners during any and all exchanges
with the government and people of Japan. The goal of removing unsustainable, high risk
military bases in the middle of urban centers is laudable and desired by military planners
and civilian populations.

Yet the decision of where to move those bases must be

critically examined rather than hastily decided. Factors such as the purpose of these
military forces being stationed in Japan must be clarified, the complicated histories of
Japan with its regional neighbors must be understood and the burden of military forces
stationed on Okinawa must be addressed. The past plan to move units to a new base
created off the Henoko peninsula, the so called Futenma Replacement Facility, fails to do
this and instead places political expediency ahead of well-considered strategic and
environmental planning (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 6).
The literature presents several questions that must be answered concerning the
current realignment plan of United States military forces on Okinawa. The controversy
surrounding the stationing and potential relocation of United States military forces on
Okinawa has caused complications to the otherwise stable United States-Japanese
relationship.

Addressing this controversy is crucial to the maintenance of positive

relations between the two states and developing clear, appropriate solutions that can
survive the test of time.
To accomplish this, criteria must be developed to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the currently proposed relocation plans and alternate future proposals.
The previous examination of the history and current status of United States military
forces in Japan provide a clear basis for which to develop these criteria. This study will
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therefore use the following criteria in the analysis of current and future basing proposals
of United States military units in Japan:
1. The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive United StatesJapanese relations;
2. Any restructure of United States military units and bases in Japan must consider
their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula;
3. United States military forces in Japan act as an honest broker and stabilizing force
while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past;
4. The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the
security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.
Effective and sustainable stationing of United States military units in Japan must
address these criteria or risk deficiencies to military capabilities in the region, whether
they be due to poor positioning of military units in relation to contingencies or from local
base controversies that affect the Japanese national decision-making process.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Utilizing data provided from the annually published Base Structure Report, published
by the Office of Installations and Environment within the Department of Defense, this
research will examine and map the basing and unit allocation of United States military
forces in Japan on a prefecture basis. Next, maps of these bases will be overlaid with
population densities of Japan to understand better the bases’ potential effects on local
populations. Combined with this, an overlay of Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) bases
will be created for the consideration of joint basing between United States-JSDF forces.
Finally, geographic distance between core units of the 3rd MEF will be examined and a
map will be created to illustrate distance constraints. With these tools in place, a better
understanding of the existing relocation plan, or any alternate relocation plans, can
provide the geographic framework for recommendations to policy-makers.

3.2 Base Structure Report
Published in various forms since the 1990s, the Base Structure Report has
maintained its modern format since 2002 and releases an updated version every
September 30th. This report provides “a consolidated summary of annual real property
inventory data that is reported by each of the Military Departments’ and Washington
Headquarters Services’ based on their native real property databases” (Department of
Defense, 2011, p. 2).

Considered a summary of Department of Defense property

worldwide, it nonetheless provides a detailed account of the majority of American
military installations that are otherwise not easily, or publicly, attainable.
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These installations are listed individually with several installations frequently
making up one base yet listed as a separate line item due to differences in military
service, mission type or actual physical distance. Each installation line item includes
several variables pertinent to this study and includes:
Nearest City – Identifies the name of the city in which the real property assets are located
or the name of the city nearest the assets.
Total Acres – Identifies the total number of acres at the listed site. It includes public
land, land owned by other federal agencies and acreage of foreign land used by the
Department of Defense.
Plant Replacement Value ($M) – Indicates the total Plant Replacement Value (PRV), in
millions, for all facilities, per line item. This value represents the calculated cost to
replace the current physical plant using today’s construction costs and standards. Larger
values equate to installations generally better suited to large numbers of personnel.
Military Personnel – This is the number of military personnel working at the installation
as listed in the report. This number is not an official count of base personnel and is listed
in the report to reflect ‘relative magnitude’ of service related personnel. It is used as such
in the context of this study.
The 2011 Base Structure Report identifies 85 installations within Japan spread
throughout 13 of Japan’s 47 prefectures. Many of these installations actually form parts
of a major base and represent individual tenant commands within the overarching United
States military presence in that prefecture. This study, considering only the realignment
of major units of United States military forces in Japan, narrowed the installation list
down to only those installations that either currently, or have the potential to, support
large numbers of additional air and ground units, such as those of the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force. Table 3.1 shows the installations included by these criteria.
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Table 3.1 Major Installations of United States Forces Japan

Criteria
Base Type
Prefecture
PRV Large Site
Marine Base Okinawa
PRV Medium
Site
Air Base
Okinawa
PRV Large Site
Marine Base Okinawa
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Okinawa
Major
Installation
Marine Base Okinawa
PRV Medium
Site
Marine Base Okinawa
Major
Installation
Training
Okinawa
Major
Installation
Naval Base
Nagasaki
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Yamaguchi
Major
Installation
Naval Base
Kanagawa
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Kanagawa
PRV Medium
Site
Marine Base Kanagawa
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Tokyo
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Aomori
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011)

Installation Name
Camp Kinser

Branch of
Service
USMC Active

MCAS Futenma
Camp Foster
Kadena AB

USMC Active
USMC Active
USAF Active

Camp Courtney

USMC Active

Camp Hansen

USMC Active

Camp Gonsalves

USMC Active

Sasebo
MCAS Iwakuni

Navy Active
USMC Active

Yokosuka
Atsugi

Navy Active
Navy Active

Camp Zama
Yokota AB
Misawa AB

Army Active
USAF Active
USAF Active

There are two primary limitations with the usage of the Base Structure Report and
it is important to note them, though generally, they are not prohibitive to this specific
study.

First, only overseas installations “larger than 10 acres OR have a Plant

Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million will be shown” as line item entries on
the installation list (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 4). Installations not meeting these
criteria are totaled under a single line item entry entitled Other which is the final entry for
each state.
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Next, not all Department of Defense installations are listed on this report as
evidenced by a complete exclusion of any and all reference to installations in
Afghanistan, Iraq or certain other states hosting American military units during the
Global War on Terror such as Kyrgyzstan (Schwirtz, 2011). Though this does not
directly affect the purposes of this study, to the author’s knowledge, the fact that gaps
exist in the report must be considered.

3.3 Japanese Self Defense Force Bases
Japan is not solely protected by military forces of the United States and maintains
a capable military force charged with protecting Japanese interests and borders within
Japanese sovereign territory. These forces, collectively called the Japanese Self Defense
Force (JSDF), are stationed throughout the islands of Japan and frequently train, supply
and coordinate operations with United States military forces in Japan. For the purposes
of this study and the realignment of forces from Okinawa, JSDF major bases throughout
the islands of Japan will be considered as possible locations for the realignment of the 3rd
MEF.
Similar to United States military forces in Japan, the JSDF maintains many
installations, large and small, throughout the islands of Japan. Utilizing the Japanese
Ministry of Defense’s public listing of units and bases (Japanese Ministry of Defense,
2011; 2012a; 2012b), this study narrowed down the possible list of relocation sites to
only JSDF forces on the Division (ground forces totaling 5,000 or more), Fleet (a
squadron of destroyers or more), or Wing level (a squadron of fighter planes or more).
This provides a listing of major JSDF bases throughout Japan that could possibly support
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the relocation of the 3rd MEF. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of these major JSDF
bases throughout Japan.
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Figure 3.1 Major Japanese Self Defense Force bases throughout Japan. Data Source:
Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b).
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3.4 United States Military Transportation Capabilities
A factor not frequently discussed in the literature, yet extremely important in the
viability of military units, is the transportation and range of military units. No discussion
on the relocation of military units can ignore the transportation requirements imposed
upon them by the geography of the region. In the case of East Asia and the Pacific, this
is particularly a problem due to the vast expanses of open-ocean, which are only
infrequently broken by small atolls or sparsely inhabited islands.
The relocation of United States military units from Okinawa to any planned or
alternate location must consider this challenge as it relates to their mission. United States
military units on Okinawa form just a portion of both United States forces in Japan,
called United States Forces Japan (USFJ), and the unified combatant command, Pacific
Command (USPACOM).

USFJ, itself a subordinate command under USPACOM,

oversees all American military forces in Japan regardless of service affiliation. This is
especially important given the requirement for intra-service cooperation, as it relates to
transportation and logistics, in the East Asian-Pacific region. Given the vast distances
between non-hostile land territories in the region, only naval vessels or long-range
aircraft can provide the necessary endurance capability to transport military units.
Naval

In order to meet these requirements, the Marine units on Okinawa, which are
considered an Expeditionary Force, have specific naval ships assigned for transportation
and logistics requirements in order to move them to any potential contingency location.
These ships, designated Amphibious Squadron 11 (Phibron 11), are currently stationed in
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Sasebo, Japan, on the island of Kyushu. Comprised of one amphibious assault ship (USS
Essex), one amphibious transport dock (USS Denver), and two dock landing ships (USS
Tortuga and USS Germantown), Phibron 11 is responsible for transportation and the
amphibious operations of Marine units currently stationed on Okinawa. With a mission
statement to “provide centralized planning embarkation, movement, control, coordination
and integration of all aspects of Amphibious Warfare” (United States Navy, 2012) these
ships provide a ‘you call, we haul’ capability required to meet the demands of
expeditionary Marine units such as those currently on Okinawa. Current relocation plans
for elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force do not include any planned move for
ships of Phibron 11. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it is not expected that the
homeport of any of these transport ships will be changed in the coming years and Sasebo
will be utilized as the starting point for any required movements of these ships.
With the support of refueling vessels, the ships of Phibron 11 have the capability
to transport an entire expeditionary unit around the world. Their limiting factor is speed
and not distance.

Though much has changed in technology for air and ground

transportation in the past hundred years, maritime travel has remained relatively static in
speed at around 20 knots or 37 kilometers per hour (Webb, 2007, p. 301-302). This
equates to approximately 900 kilometers per day with Table 3.2 showing the estimated
one-way travel times with a starting point of Sasebo, Japan. Adding to these times is the
process of embarkation or loading of all required units, supplies and equipment. This
process takes between one and a half to three days to complete, in good conditions, once
the ships have docked at the embarkation point (Tabios, 2007; Kyhl, 2011).
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Table 3.2 Distance and travel times for Amphibious Squadron 11 stationed in Sasebo,
Japan
Sasebo to:
Okinawa
Subic Bay,
Philippines
Guam
Singapore
Darwin, Australia

Distance
(km)
746

Travel
Time
20 hrs

2523
2751
4617
5100

68 hrs
74 hrs
124 hrs
137 hrs

Once fully loaded, the squadron will travel to the contingency location and
conduct operations in accordance with the mission. Though the process is relatively
straightforward, the current separation of forces, Phibron 11 in Sasebo and the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, creates, in the minimum, a delay of three days,
from activation to delivery, in the event of contingency operations in Korea or Japan.
Any relocation of these Marine units to locations further than Okinawa from
Sasebo will create increased delay times. Therefore the role of geographic distance from
Sasebo, Japan, the home port of Phibron 11, to any proposed relocation site for the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force will be considered a criterion to determine relocation
viability.
Air

Given the vast distances involved in transportation within the East Asian-Pacific
theatre, air transportation would initially seem an ideal alternative to naval transportation.
Though air travel is faster it suffers from several negative inherent factors that make it
less preferable than maritime travel. First amongst these is lift capability and cost. The
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United States maintains several long range aircraft capable of transporting Marine
infantry units and portions of their equipment. Yet full deployment of artillery, rotary
and potential armor units becomes prohibitive through air travel alone. When cost is
factored in, the reality of too little being delivered for too high of a cost becomes
apparent. For example, during the First Gulf War, “the United States [spent] $2.37
billion on airlift, which was more than half the total $4.57 billion spent on transport
during the whole campaign” (Webb, 2007, p. 303) while only transporting 10% of the
supplies and equipment through air transport.

Additionally, it is not apparent that

sufficient large air transports will be positioned in locations capable for re-positioning the
3rd MEF in case of contingency operations.
Another factor is the type of contingency operations to which the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force would be responding. In the case of a humanitarian crisis, such as
the 2004 or 2011 tsunamis, air transports can expect friendly air corridors through which
to travel and deliver military forces providing assistance. Unfortunately, this situation
cannot be assumed in the case of contingency operations when the use of force is
expected. Instead the likelihood that these Marine expeditionary forces will be entering a
combat zone with hostile or contested skies is highly likely, thereby calling into question
the feasibility of delivering these quick response units safely.
A final factor in the discussion on air transportation with the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force is the capabilities of attached helicopter transports. Currently the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force contains several squadrons of CH-46s which serve as
medium lift, short range transports for elements of the 3rd MEF. The CH-46s, with a
combat radius of 296 kilometers, have provided the Marine Corps with the required
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battlefield transportation capability needed to maneuver and succeed in its expeditionary
mission since the Vietnam War. Yet due to its age they suffer from slower speeds and
shorter ranges than alternate options available.
In order to support the ongoing expeditionary role of the Marine Corps, the
Department of Defense contracted with Boeing to purchase the newly developed MV-22
to replace existing CH-46 squadrons throughout the Marine Corps. Though troubled by
early design flaws the MV-22 has nonetheless earned high praise from Marine Corps
commanders since its first combat missions in Iraq in 2007 (Federal News Service,
2009). This has been primarily due to its increased range, combat radius of 1,111
kilometers, and speed of 443 kilometers an hour (Boeing, 2012b) versus the 248
kilometers an hour for the CH-46 (Boeing, 2012a).

3.5 Summary
The methods and procedures detailed above will assist in critically examining the
current realignment plan of the 3rd MEF as presented by the Governments of Japan and
the United States, along with developing any alternate realignment plan required.
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4. Examination of the current relocation plan
4.1 Introduction
The relocation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from various facilities
throughout Okinawa, though primarily MCAS Futenma, to an alternate location either
within the prefecture of Okinawa or out of Japan, has been shown to have gone through
several iterations. Discussed primarily since 1995, these relocation plans have failed to
pass the planning stages as Japanese domestic politics vacillate between acquiescing to
American demands for a new offshore base to arguing for the complete removal of all
American military forces from Okinawa.
The most controversial plan thus far had been the Futenma Replacement Facility,
which sought to reclaim land off the Henoko Peninsula and build runways over a
nationally protected environmental site. Encountering stiff resistance at the local level,
this plan had progressed forward until the fall of 2011 when the United States agreed to
separate the discussion of the new runways off Henoko with the transfer of large portions
of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force off of Okinawa (Takenaka, 2012). The transfer of
these forces off of Okinawa seems to satisfy many of the complaints of the Japanese
public. Yet an examination of how these new locations support United States policies in
the region, through the application of the criteria established above, must be completed to
ensure the relocation supports the strategic view rather than short term diplomatic goals.

4.2 The Current Realignment Plan
The current relocation plan calls for the transfer of thousands of Marines of the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force to locations throughout the Pacific including Hawaii, Guam,
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Australia and the Philippines. Shifting from their current basing on Okinawa, these units
will either re-engage long-time traditional allies that have not seen the large-scale
permanent stationing of American military units in over twenty years or will return to the
United States in an effort to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa. The current
relocation plan calls for reducing the number of Marines on Okinawa to a cap of 10,000,
thereby forcing the United States to relocate at least 8,000 Marines to alternate locations
(Navy Times, 2012). Though these plans remain fluid, the outline below is the most
recognized relocation plan of these Marines as described by various government officials
of both states.
Guam

Hosting by far the largest shift in the relocation plan, Guam, an American
territory, stands poised to receive 4,700 Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force
from Okinawa in combination with several military improvement projects on the island
(Kan, 2012).

Originally slated to receive 8,000 Marines, Guam still offers several

challenges to the Marine Corps as adequate training, and specifically live fire drills, are
unavailable on the island requiring new facilities be developed and utilized on the
relatively nearby island of Tinian (Kan, 2012, p. 9).
Australia

In a new security arrangement agreed upon during President Obama’s November
visit to Australia, portions of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force will build up a presence
in Darwin, Australia eventually totaling 2,500 by 2016. The first time American military
forces have been stationed in Australia since the Vietnam War, these units are to support
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the United States reengagement with states of South East Asia and balance the force
posture of East Asia from being primarily focused in North East Asia to one that is
visible throughout the entire region (Nicholas & Parsons, 2011; Kan, 2012, p. 4-9).
Other locations

Several other locations have been named to be recipients of Marines of the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa. Hawaii, with its large existing military
presence, is expected to receive 1,000 (Navy Times, 2012) while Singapore and the
Philippines, already home to small detachments of United States military forces, are in
negotiations with the United States to host an unknown number of 3rd MEF Marines
(Kan, 8, 2012; Tritten, 2012).
Remarking on the new deployment strategy, one Stars and Stripes reporter, based
on comments from official sources, states “The new deployments and bases could
combine with existing units in Japan, Hawaii and California to create a string of Marine
Corps forces that stretches 7,700 miles and projects as far as the Indian Ocean” (Tritten,
2012).

Not mentioned is how these forces will interact and serve the overarching

missions and agendas of the 3rd MEF itself and United States regional foreign policy as a
whole. Figure 4.1 shows the projected regional locations of the relocated Marines of the
3rd MEF.
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Figure 4.1 Planned realignment locations of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force.
Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source:
Department of Defense (2011).
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4.3 Critical Analysis through the Criteria
The planned diversification of United States military forces on Okinawa to
locations throughout the Pacific at first seems to satisfy the needs of sustaining the United
States-Japanese alliance and preserving our forward presence in East Asia. Yet broader
concerns with United States military and foreign policy in the region do not seem to have
been addressed.
Early discussions by the Overseas Basing Commission in 2005 on the relocation
of Marines from Okinawa to Guam faced criticism from the Commission itself stating
“Nor are we sure that current discussions on relocating U.S. forces on Okinawa
adequately addresses strategic concerns for U.S. security interests in East Asia”
(Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. ii). How then does the planned relocation match
the criteria established? The section below applies each of the four criteria individually
to the existing relocation plans to determine if it matches the needs and purpose of
American strategy in East Asia.
Criterion 1: The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive USJapanese relations
Perhaps the most readily apparent of any of the criteria, the removal of thousands
of Marines from Okinawa to any location out of the prefecture is conducive to
improvements in US-Japanese relations. The planned cap of 10,000 Marines, along with
the removal of 8,000, signals a final shift, however gradual, in policy amongst the
prefectural Government of Okinawa, the federal government in Tokyo and the United
States.
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Considered a win to many Okinawans, these relocations though will leave many
American military facilities open on the island with specific units and installations still
undecided such as the Futenma Replacement Facility, the scope of units on Kadena Air
Base and whether Marine Aircraft Group 36, the helicopter unit a part of the 3rd MEF,
will remain on Okinawa or be transferred elsewhere.

With these questions still

unanswered, domestic politics in Japan, and therefore the United States-Japanese
alliance, will continue to face opposition.
Criterion 2: Any restructure of American military units and bases in Japan must consider
their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula
The most direct problem with the relocation of portions of the 3rd MEF from
Okinawa to different locations across the Pacific is how these elements would come
together or respond to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, or arguably anywhere, in
force. With almost 8,000 miles of ocean separating elements of the 3rd MEF, little has
been publicized on how these separate elements will travel, train or participate as a larger
military unit such as they do now on Okinawa. Questions concerning which units will be
transferred, infantry, armor, air, artillery, or a combination of all four, have not been
answered beyond the rough estimates of personnel figures. No information, for instance
on the disbursement of the Marine Aircraft Group 36, containing squadrons of helicopters
detested by the Okinawans, has been released or even if they will leave Okinawa at all.
Additionally the logistics complications of these units, spread throughout the Pacific,
have not been addressed or seemingly accounted for. Discussing these types of concerns
in 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission stated:
Our military forces must be able to meet the force projection demands
placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Their training and
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equipment must be adequate to the task, access to key locations assured,
and units and bases protected to the degree commensurate with the risks
we ask our service men and women to undertake. It is not clear that all of
these concerns have been addressed.
A central objective of a rebasing strategy is to ensure availability of
requisite combat power at the point of need. As we return forces from
overseas, shift them within and between combatant commands, and
transform them into more readily deployable units we seek an outcome of
enhanced mobility. The Commission is concerned, however, that
adequate strategic sealift, airlift, and prepositioned equipment and stocks
do not exist and that current intra-theater airlift is over-stressed. Aside
from the lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air and
sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems
are not adequate to meet potential contingencies. Moreover, the
Commission notes that budgetary plans for mobility assets are inadequate
to meet projected lift demand. (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. iv)
Therefore, the need for clear guidance on the mobility of American forces
realigning in the Pacific is crucial to their combat readiness.

Even without

knowing the exact distribution of 3rd MEF units throughout the Pacific, two
courses of actions can be posited that span the spectrum from the most logistically
simple to the most complex.
Personnel only
A personnel-only plan is the most straightforward realignment of forces in the
Pacific. They could be relocated to these alternate bases with none of their supporting
equipment such as tanks, helicopters or artillery. Beyond creating an obvious challenge
for training, the preservation of units with this equipment, such as the Marine Aircraft
Group 36 on Okinawa, would fail to satisfy the demands of the Okinawans and the first
criterion of this examination.

Furthermore, as the Overseas Basing Commission

highlighted above, the strategic airlift requirements for these widely dispersed units are
either not in place or insufficient to transport the realigned units back to Okinawa or a
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central location where they could be embarked by elements of Phibron 11, the Naval
ships designated to transport them to locations of need. Unable to reunite with their host
and command units on Okinawa, these 8,000 Marines would either be delayed from
entering any contingency operation ordered for the 3rd MEF or hinder the ability of the 3rd
MEF to respond to a contingency operation in the first place. As the simplest option for
the realignment of forces from Okinawa throughout the Pacific, such outcomes call into
question the expected purpose, in the eyes of force planners, of the 3rd MEF being
forward deployed in the Pacific at all.
Personnel and Heavy Equipment
Realigning whole units of Marines with their equipment, tanks, helicopters and
artillery is the more complex option for realigning forces in the Pacific. This would
support their training missions and maintain high levels of readiness, desired by any
military commander, and their response to a contingency operation ordered for the 3rd
MEF.
Considering only the travel and embarkation times for Phibron 11 from Sasebo to
Guam to Okinawa, in order to embark the largest number of Marines and equipment in
the shortest amount of time, there is significant delay from the initial warning order to
deployable readiness; see Figure 4.2 below for the estimated travel delay.

In this

scenario, traveling to and embarking Marines and equipment relocated to Australia,
Singapore or the Philippines would present too large a delay. The resulting absence
would weaken the capabilities of the 3rd MEF. Parent and MacDonald (2011), though
calling for a decline in American military forces in Japan, recognize that response times
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to contingency operations are crucial and state that “defending the territorial integrity of
Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands
rapid-response forces with strong reserves” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43). It is
hard to see therefore how diffusing geographically the 3rd MEF will preserve its current
rapid response capability in support of its forward-deployed mission.
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Figure 4.2 Straight line travel distance and travel time for Amphibious Squadron
11 departing Sasebo, Japan for Guam then Okinawa. Embarkation times are not
included. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Travel
times based on Phibron 11’s speed of 37/km/hr.
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In any scenario that separates elements of a military division, it must be
understood that, though they are in many cases separate entities, artillery, armor, and
infantry, these elements work and fight as a whole force. The separation and likelihood
of only partial deployment of the whole presents operational planners with difficult
decisions during contingency operations. Should partial units respond to the contingency
while not at full operational capability? Or should the unit be fully reconstituted, creating
a delay, before it is deployed and thereby increase the risk of the contingency becoming
more difficult to address?

Finally, should the unit not be allocated contingency

operations due to the many unknowns revolving around its logistical dilemmas?
Questions such as these, and the difficult answers they develop, seriously call into
question the wide distribution of the 3rd MEF across the vast expanses of the Pacific
Ocean.
Criterion 3: American military forces in Japan act as an ‘honest broker’ and stabilizing
force while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past
The removal of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to outside of Japan will signal a
declining commitment of the United States to Japanese and South Korean security as
rising regional competitors continue to flex their increased military and political clout.
Japan’s Yoshida Doctrine of relying on the United States for security while capping
domestic defense spending and capabilities may come under fire as revisionists seek to
redefine Japan in the 21st century through a loosening of restrictions on weapons sales
and development along with increased military deployments (Heginbotham, Ratner and
Samuels, 2011, p. 140-148). The move of Japan to become a normal nation and maintain
its own military (Samuels, 2008, p. 5-6) is likely to become stronger (Samuels, 2008, p.
181-183). In the context of a recent history of military aggression throughout the region,
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this is likely to encourage states such as North and South Korea, Russia and China to
develop military policies against any rise in Japanese militarism. Conversely, states such
as Singapore and the Philippines will likely welcome an increased American military
presence as China expands naval operations in the South China Sea, though there is no
requirement that elements of the 3rd MEF fulfill this need. Rotations and stationing of
American military personnel in these, and other states such as Australia, should come
from units currently stationed outside of Japan. Only by doing so, and preserving the
levels of American military forces in Japan at current levels, can the United States
provide the security guarantee sought by the Yoshida Doctrine.
Criterion 4: The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the
security and foreign policy objectives of the United States
The stationing of United States military forces in Japan provides the United States
with a stable, regional presence, demonstrating our commitment to allies and security
partners throughout the region. Japan, balanced off the coast of the Asian continent as
the United Kingdom is off the coast of the European continent, offers much in the way of
access for economic, political and military reasons. Therefore maintaining adequate
levels of combat power in Japan supports the wide range of missions of the United States
while presenting a visible deterrent to any land power seeking to expand in the region.
The removal of significant portions of these combat forces signals a weakening of resolve
on the part of the United States at a time when our leaders seek to deepen our regional
commitment (Lothian and Jansen, 2011). Furthermore, as discussed above relating to
Korea, the dispersion of the 3rd MEF throughout the Pacific, instead of maintaining unit
coherency, questions the responsiveness and operational viability of the unit to regional
contingency operations, and particularly ones involving combat operations.
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Rear

Admiral Dur, the former Director of the Strategy and Policy Division in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, has discussed the importance of force posture and stationing
and had this to say on forward-deployed naval forces such as the 3rd MEF:
Presence forces are shaped for combat. Forward deployed naval forces
provide the critical link between peacetime operations and the initial
requirements for a developing crisis or major regional contingency. Their
forcible entry capabilities provide the initial response and enabling
capability for subsequent joint operations on a large scale in the event of
conflict.
Our defense commitments and global interests require a robust forward
naval presence. Forward presence has been a trademark of the Navy and
the Marine Corps. And its importance is likely to grow in the uncertain
future. If we can identify specific national interests and regional
objectives that can be advanced or protected by naval power, we can then
determine the levels of forces necessary to secure those interests.
Defining the forces we need for presence need not be guesswork.
Naval forces – like all elements of a military arsenal – are built to fight
and win wars. But their most important role by far is to be positioned to
prevent them. Sized and configured to meet military objectives, naval
forces serve the nation’s varied interests on a regular and continuous basis
– in the littorals and on the open ocean, where U.S. economic security
turns on free access in the world’s markets and resources.
In this regard, the past really is prologue. Naval forces deployed forward
will remain the front line in our transoceanic strategy (Dur, 2000, p. 479).
The need therefore to maintain combat ready forces in Japan, which the current
realignment plan does not consider, is crucial to United States security and foreign
policy.

4.4 Summary
The United States’ current realignment plan for elements of the 3rd MEF to
relocate to distant location throughout the Pacific does not take into consideration several
factors relating to its military and foreign policy mission. Discussions on how logistics
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will be managed between the new locations or how the 3rd MEF will respond to any
contingency operation have neither been discussed nor seemingly planned for.
Additionally the domestic politics of Japan, as it relates to military development and
normalization, has not been considered.

Finally, the re-posturing of United States

military forces throughout East Asia, though important for our relations with states in
South East Asia such as the Philippines and Singapore, ultimately fails to consider
alternate military units such as the 2nd MEF stationed in San Diego. Doing so would
maintain the unit coherency of the 3rd MEF and provide a combat-ready deterrent
available for any regional contingency operation. The Overseas Basing Commission
identified the lack of long-term planning on the part of the Department of Defense and its
statements hold as true for the current realignment plan as in 2005:
Our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its
own right. It must, therefore be fully integrated with every other facet of
strategy before it can properly affixed. It is our opinion that the enormity
of this point, and the discussion that it demands, has not been taken into
account to the degree that it merits (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005,
p. 6).
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Chapter 5: Alternate Relocation Plans
5.1 Introduction
Realignment plans developed by the Governments of the United States and Japan
have thus far been unable to provide options that satisfy the requirements of the United
States’ regional objectives while addressing the domestic concerns of Japanese civilians
on Okinawa. The need therefore to examine alternate plans that satisfy the criteria
established is clear. Any alternate realignment plan must consider the criteria established
and must satisfy them better than the existing plan as put forth by the United States.
A review of the criteria recognizes that the most limiting factor for the
realignment of forces are the logistics and transportation factors. The dispersing of the
3rd MEF throughout the Pacific and then requiring adequate transportation back to either
a centralized location or the actual contingency location has not been addressed and
presents the most serious challenge to operational planners. The need therefore to realign
the 3rd MEF within a reasonable travel distance from Sasebo, Japan, the homeport of
Phibron 11, their assigned naval transportation, would be logical to minimize travel times
and maximize operational capability. Additionally the maintenance of these forces, if
possible within Japan but outside the prefecture of Okinawa, would support United States
military and foreign policy objectives in the region. Therefore locations on the main
islands of Japan (Kyushu, Honshu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido) should be considered with a
preference for established military locations with low population densities in order to
prevent a planning challenge such as happened on Okinawa from reoccurring. With clear
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guidelines on the requirements for an alternate realignment plan the options can be
mapped out and selected, based on their satisfaction of the criteria.

5.2 The Alternatives
First, the spatial and temporal distance or radius for acceptable realignment
locations must be established. This alternate realignment plan sets the existing spatial
and temporal distance of Sasebo, Japan to Naha, Japan as the acceptable standard by
which alternate realignment locations can be measured.

With a distance of 746

kilometers, ships of Phibron 11, traveling at an average speed of 20 knots (37 km/h)
would take 20 hours of pure travel time to travel, one way, between the two locations.
Therefore the spatial factor is 746 kilometers and the temporal factor is 20 hours.
Portions of Japan that fall within this radius include the regions of Kyushu, Shikoku,
Chūgoku, and Kansai, along with all or a portion of the prefectures of Aichi, Gifu,
Shizuoka, Nagano, Ishikawa and Toyama in the Chūbu region. Figure 5.1 illustrates the
extent of the spatial radius from Sasebo, Japan, including major bases of United States
Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
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Figure 5.1 Current travel distance of Amphibious Squadron 11 from Sasebo to Okinawa.
Radius reflects all locations within the same travel distance. Map Data Source: Global
Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011) and
Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b).
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As reflected in Figure 5.1, several locations of USFJ and JSDF forces on the
islands of Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku are within the acceptable range of Phibron 11.
Additionally, Figure 6.1 provides guidance on more acceptable prefectures, based on
population density, than Okinawa, which has a higher population density of 612
residents/km2. Utilizing this, the prefectures that would be suitable for the relocation of
the 3rd MEF, taking into consideration those that currently host major USFJ or JSDF
forces, and have a lower population density than Okinawa, can be tabulated for
consideration. These prefectures are listed in Table 6.1.
Table 5.1 Prefectures within Phibron 11’s acceptable range that currently host USFJ or
JSDF units and have a lower population density than Okinawa.
Prefecture
Hiroshima
Ishikawa
Kagoshima
Kumamoto
Kyoto
Miyagi

Major USFJ Units
Present
Minor Depots
None
None
None
None
None

Population
Density / km2
337
280
186
245
572
322

Major JSDF Units Present
4th Escort Flotilla
6th Air Wing
1st Fleet Air Wing
8th Division
3rd Escort Flotilla
5th Air Wing
2nd Escort Flotilla, 22nd Fleet
Nagasaki
Phibron 11
Air Wing
348
Yamaguchi
MCAS Iwakuni
31st Fleet Air Wing
237
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011) and Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011,
2012a, 2012b).
The eight prefectures listed in Table 6.1 provide guidance on possible alternate
locations for the relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa.

A final, if less likely,

transportation factor to consider is the possibility of elements of the 3rd MEF responding
to a contingency operation on the Korean Peninsula by means of their integrated air
transport only. This integrated air transport, in the form of the MV-22 Osprey, can
provide a mission radius of 1,111 kilometers to elements of the 3rd MEF, facilitating rapid
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deployment to possible contingency operations within this range. Likely locations within
South Korea that the 3rd MEF would respond to, if only to layover for supplies and
refueling, include Kunsan Air Base, a part of United States Forces Korea (USFK), and
Daegu Air Base, a base of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROK AFB). These bases are
distant enough from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the most likely combat area with
anti-aircraft capabilities, and maintain sufficient fuel and accommodations to serve either
as a layover or temporary forward location in South Korea for elements of the 3rd MEF
transported by MV-22s.
Figure 5.2 depicts the combat radius of the MV-22, centered on the Republic of
Korea Air Force Base in Daegu 3 to reflect areas within Japan that could serve as the
permanent home of the 3rd MEF, with attached MV-22s, and reach this potential
temporary location during a crisis on the Korea Peninsula. Due to the wide combat
radius of the MV-22, most of Japan, excluding Hokkaido, is within this radius, including
all the USFJ and JSDF bases selected from Figure 6.1.
The relocating of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa to any of the potential bases
identified in Figure 6.1 satisfies the entire criteria established in Chapter 3. Locations
such as MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi prefecture or any of the bases near Sasebo in
Nagasaki prefecture could support the 3rd MEF and offer less potential for domestic
disturbance than Okinawa. Additionally, the maintenance of the 3rd MEF within Japan

3

Daegu Air Base was chosen over Kunsan due to its closer proximity to Japan and
increased distance from the DMZ. Though Japan and South Korea maintain stiff
relations and are engaged in several international disputes, it is assumed that United
States military forces would be accepted at a Korean base, particularly during a crisis.
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and their proximity to the Korean Peninsula would appear to support all United States
military and foreign policy objectives.
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Figure 5.2 MV-22 combat radius if responding to contingency operations on the Korean
Peninsula. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data
Source: Department of Defense (2011). MV-22 Source: Boeing (2012b)
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter has identified several alternate locations within Japan for the
relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa in lieu of existing plans that spread the 3rd MEF
throughout the Pacific. Any of the major military facilities within the eight prefectures
identified could adequately serve as the new home of the 3rd MEF, either in force or in
sections separated by minimal land distances and thereby maintaining coherency. It is up
to military planners and diplomatic officials to work with the Government of Japan to
identify which one will be the most domestically acceptable option.

76

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was to analyze the current realignment plan of United
States military forces on Okinawa and offer alternatives that focus on the strategic
operations of the 3rd MEF, rather than the short-term political desires of both
governments.
Through the establishment of criteria detailing the mission of the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force, the foreign policy objectives of the United States and strategic
theory, this thesis was able to show that current realignment plans of United States
military forces on Okinawa fail to account for several critical factors. The transportation
and logistics element of supporting dispersed quick response units has not been
considered nor planned for. Contingency operations on the Korean Peninsula, arguably
the purpose for the United States Forces Japan’s stationing, has also not been adequately
planned for.
The alternate relocation option presented would see elements of the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Force relocate to existing military facilities on Kyushu or Honshu in
low[er] population density prefectures. Though challenges exist to alternate plans such
as these (Burke and Sumida, 2012), the proposed option presented offers the most viable
alternative to the existing plan and meets the military and foreign policy objectives of the
United States.
Additionally the possibility of joint basing, or combined bases between United
States Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Force, will support the alliance
through increased integration and operability. The greater the linkage is, the deeper the
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alliance becomes.

Discussing alliance structure between the United States and its

European allies, Walt states: “The greater the level of institutionalization within an
alliance, the more likely it is to endure despite an extensive change in the array of
external threats” (Walt, 2000, p. 327). The post-Cold War environment in East Asia has
seen an evolution of the threats to regional stability and peace. Gone are the days of the
threat of global nuclear war. They have been replaced by a modernizing, robust Chinese
military flexing its military power in the so-called first island chain (Brookes, 2009). Not
to be forgotten, North Korean missile and nuclear development continues unhindered by
years of economic sanctions (United Nations News Centre, 2012). In the context of these
East Asian 21st century power politics, particularly with a Japan that has yet to settle
long-held emotional memories with its neighboring states, the need for deeper security
linkages with the United States is paramount to a stable, non-confrontational region.
In the case of Okinawa, policy planners in both Japan and the United States
should critically examine the political feasibility of moving existing military units to the
main islands of Japan to support the United States’ defense commitment and alleviate the
extraordinary burden placed on the people of Okinawa relative to their fellow citizens on
Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku.

This move would strengthen the United

States-Japan security alliance, lower or remove anti-American sentiment prevalent
throughout the country and improve the strategic and tactical requirements of the
American military objectives in the region.
Additionally, the spatial and geographic importance of Mackinder and Mahan’s
theories are shown to remain valid even after nearly a century of geopolitical upheaval.
The need to maintain modern-day coaling stations for our forces overseas continues to
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have significance in today’s ever more globalized world. Though the threat of a Eurasian
hegemon dominating the heartland has diminished, the need to balance against its rise
requires an American military presence at crucial locations. Japan, positioned off the
Eurasian continent with direct sea lanes of communication and supply to the United
States, serves as one of these.

Future researchers should consider the continuing

importance of these theories as, while states, governments, and policies rise and fall,
geography will remain the same.
Looking forward, researchers could utilize the challenges and opportunities
presented in the case of Okinawa to develop best practices with our partner states in East
Asia and better posture the United States for what Secretary Clinton recently called
“America's Pacific century” (Clinton, 2011). Through this framework of maximizing
geo-strategic interests, the development needs of the local populations and addressing
partner states’ concerns for the local environment, researchers should be able to analyze
more clearly the future of American military and foreign policy both in the Pacific and,
more broadly, throughout the global basing structure of American overseas forces.
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Appendix A.
Branch of
Service
USMC Active

Criteria
Base Type
Prefecture
Installation Name
PRV Large Site
Marine Base Okinawa
Camp Kinser
PRV Medium
Site
Air Base
Okinawa
MCAS Futenma
USMC Active
PRV Large Site
Marine Base Okinawa
Camp Foster
USMC Active
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Okinawa
Kadena AB
USAF Active
Major
Installation
Marine Base Okinawa
Camp Courtney
USMC Active
PRV Medium
Site
Marine Base Okinawa
Camp Hansen
USMC Active
Major
Installation
Training
Okinawa
Camp Gonsalves
USMC Active
Major
Installation
Naval Base
Nagasaki
Sasebo
Navy Active
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Yamaguchi
MCAS Iwakuni
USMC Active
Major
Installation
Naval Base
Kanagawa
Yokosuka
Navy Active
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Kanagawa
Atsugi
Navy Active
PRV Medium
Site
Marine Base Kanagawa
Camp Zama
Army Active
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Tokyo
Yokota AB
USAF Active
PRV Large Site
Air Base
Aomori
Misawa AB
USAF Active
Major Bases of United States Forces Japan. Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
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Appendix B.
Unit Name
Prefecture
Location
Branch
2nd Fleet Air Wing
Aomori
Hachinohe
Air
3rd Air Wing
Aomori
Misawa
Air
21st Fleet Air Wing
Chiba
Tateyama
Air
8th Air Wing
Fukuoka
Tsuiki
Air
2nd Air Wing
Hokkaido
Chitose
Air
7th Air Wing
Ibaraki
Hyakuri
Air
6th Air Wing
Ishikawa
Komatsu
Air
1st Fleet Air Wing
Kagoshima
Kanoya
Air
4th Fleet Air Wing
Kanagawa
Atsugi
Air
5th Air Wing
Miyazaki
Nyutabaru
Air
22nd Fleet Air Wing
Nagasaki
Omura
Air
83rd Air Wing
Okinawa
Naha
Air
Central Aircraft Control and Warning
Wing
Saitama
Iruma
Air
31st Fleet Air Wing
Yamaguchi
Iwakuni
Air
10th Division
Aichi
Moriyama
Ground
9th Division
Aomori
Aomori
Ground
4th Division
Fukuoka
Fukuoka
Ground
2nd Division
Hokkaido
Asahikawa
Ground
7th Division
Hokkaido
Higashi Chitose
Ground
3rd Division
Hyogo
Senzo
Ground
8th Division
Kumamoto
Kita Kumanmoto Ground
1st Division
Tokyo
Nerima
Ground
6th Division
Yamagata
Jinmachi
Ground
4th Escort Flotilla
Hiroshima
Kure
Naval
1st Escort Flotilla
Kanagawa
Yokosuka
Naval
3rd Escort Flotilla
Kyoto
Maizuru
Naval
2nd Escort Flotilla
Nagasaki
Sasebo
Naval
Major Bases of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Note the Naval Fleet Air Wings have
been designated ‘Air’ units for the purposes of this study. This is to recognize their
impact on the base communities rather than their specific service affiliation. Data
Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b).
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